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Abstract
A great challenge facing future agricultural water policy is to explore the potential for
transition from the current myopic competitive (common) exploitation of groundwater
resources to a long-term efficient and sustainable allocation. A number of economic
and/or command and control instruments can be used by the relevant water authority
in order to deal with the economic and environmental problems generated by
competitive exploitation. However, according to previous experience in both
developed and developing countries, tradable permits seem as one of the most
effective and efficient instruments, especially under conditions of limited water
availability. On this account, the aim of the current study is to explore the feasibility
and implementation of a tradable permit system in irrigated agriculture. To this end,
two distinct optimization models are applied and compared: (a) an individual farmer’s
model (representing the myopic non-cooperative exploitation of groundwater) and (b)
a social planner’s model (representing the cooperative and sustainable allocation).
The deviation of their results shows the rationale for using a tradable permit system,
while the final allocation of the social planner’s model, solved as an optimal control
problem that maximizes the social welfare under specific water policy objectives,
denotes the equilibrium state of this system. The two models are then applied in a
typical rural area of Greece where groundwater is the only source of irrigated
agriculture. The derived time paths for water consumption and water availability
illustrate the significant environmental benefits from the future implementation of a
tradable permit system.
JEL codes: Q15, Q25, Q28
Keywords: tradable water permits, sustainable water use, irrigated agriculture
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1. Introduction
Water has traditionally been regarded as a free-access public good. That was true for
all water uses including agriculture. However, changes in technology, tastes,
organization and scale proved that the systems built to provide water for irrigation and
domestic uses free of charge or at heavily subsidized rates, cannot support anymore
the increasing demands and degraded (polluted and depleted) supplies. The problem is
most pressing in irrigated agriculture which accounts for more than two-thirds of
water use. Water cannot be regarded anymore as a true free-access public good, since
it is not abundant and has to be allocated among users by some type of mechanism.
The economic literature suggests that allocation mechanisms that use markets and
prices (water charges or tradable water permits) could help to ensure sustainable water
use efficient allocation, and provide incentives for the development of water-efficient
technologies in the long-run.
Tradable permits are commonly considered as one of the most efficient market-based
instruments for groundwater allocation. Water permit markets could yield the right
price and lead to the efficient allocation without the need for overall planning and
management. In a perfectly competitive setting, a permit market would ensure that
water goes to the higher value use. They are also consistent with the latest EU
guidelines for water policy that promote the use of economic instruments providing
water use efficiency and financial incentives.
The present paper examines the use of tradable permits in managing water use in
irrigated agriculture. We develop a model in which there are two groups of farmers,
producing each a high water demanding crop. All farmers share the same aquifer and
thus, the rate of change in the eater table is a function of the total water used for
irrigation. We assume that all farmers in both groups have the same marginal cost of
pumping water. However, the crop-water production function differs between the two
crops which also yield different prices in the market. Within this framework we
examine two types of aquifer management; one based on a quota system and another
on tradable water permits. The complexity of the analytical solutions does not permit
meaningful comparisons, so we resort to an empirical application, using actual data
from an agricultural region in Northern Greece. We first confirm that both systems
yield significant improvements over the benchmark case, in which individual farmers
2
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are allowed to pump water at rates that maximize their annual income, ignoring the
future impact of their action on the groundwater levels and consequently on other
farmers’ as well as their own future pumping costs. Furthermore, the results of the
empirical application show that the implementation of a tradable water permit system
yields not very significant benefits relative to a quota system. Although these results
seem to question the use of water permits systems, they are specific to the
characteristics of the area examined, which imply very similar marginal benefits for
the two crops examined.

Given that in addition, the two crops share the same

marginal costs of pumping water, the small difference in the two systems’ benefits is
not surprising at all. Augmenting the difference between the two crops, either by
widening the spread between their prices or their marginal water productivity, or
imposing a stricter water constraint, yields very significant benefits from the transfer
to a tradable permit system.
The present paper verifies both theoretically and empirically the urgent need for water
management in irrigated agriculture. In the absence of any water management system,
individual farmers could very fast deplete the available water resources. Both tradable
and non-tradable water permit systems, if well-designed, provide the basic mechanism
for sustainable water use. However, a tradable water permit system provides always
higher economic benefits. The economic improvement is positively related to the
existing differences among the technologies used in the production of different crops
and their market prices. The more diverse are the crops sharing the same aquifer, the
higher are the benefits from using a tradable water permit system.
A number of studies have evaluated various water market approaches to improve both
water quality and quantity management.1 Although most of the literature focuses on
the use of water charges, there is some work highlighting the reasoning and the
importance of using tradable water permit systems. For example, Ballestero et al.
(2002) suggest that tradable permits may significantly improve water use efficiency,
while they can also help to confront water scarcity and groundwater depletion.
Hadjigeorgalis (2009) states also that their use in smallholder agriculture, a typical
situation in most agricultural areas around the world, is likely to reduce the risk on

1

See for example, Vaux and Howitt (1984), Howe et al. (1986) and Weinberg et al. (1993).
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farmers’ income. Tradable permits are often considered as the most appropriate water
policy measure to cope with problems such as the continuous decline of groundwater
levels and/or the heavy discount on future benefits (Griffin, 2006). Besides, their
proper use may also enable water planners to approximate the optimal allocation of a
theoretical dynamic model, recovering thus the potential gains from groundwater
management (Provencher, 1993).
The main common issue addressed in these studies is the use (or the specification) of
annual market models for surface water resources, usually without considering the
long-term evolution (depletion) of groundwater resources. On the other hand,
extensive research has been conducted during the past 30 years in order to estimate
the optimal allocation of groundwater over time.2 Nevertheless, there are no studies
attempting to combine the above two methods, that is, the use of water markets as a
tool for optimal groundwater allocation, highlighting thus the need for further
research on this topic. The present paper attempts to cover this void, by developing a
model that combines a dynamic optimal groundwater allocation problem with one of
implementing a tradable water permit system. Both problems are applied exclusively
to irrigated agriculture in order to determine the optimal time path for groundwater
use in both economic and environmental terms. Making a step forward from previous
studies that implied a single homogenous group of farmers, the present paper assumes
that farmers are divided into two groups according to their main agricultural product
and their crop-water production function. Farmers’ decisions concerning water
abstraction and use are supposed to be made annually, based on the current pumping
costs. Hence, the proposed tradable permit system adopts such an empirical strategy
by using an annual system of permits, which are granted at the beginning of each
irrigation period and are valid only during this specific year.

2. The model
In the following sections two distinct optimization models are analyzed. The first one
aims to solve the problem of an individual (non-cooperative) water user, by
simulating farmers’ annual pumping decisions and estimating the associated longterm economic and environmental impacts. Farmers’ decisions are supposed to be

2

Gisser και Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp,1983; Burness and Brill, 2001; Koundouri, 2004.
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made within a short-time period (every year), without considering at all the negative
externalities of their actions (i.e. higher pumping cost to other irrigators due to
lowering of the groundwater level).
On the other hand, the second model attempts to solve the same problem under the
perspective of a social planner, who aims to maximize the aggregate long-term net
benefits of groundwater use (during the same time period as in individual farmer’s
problem). The basic assumption made in this approach is that the social planer is well
informed about the current and future state of the aquifer (i.e. the groundwater
resource), as well as of the agricultural markets. The results of this model will be next
used as a starting point for designing the appropriate economic instruments (tradable
water permits or non-transferable quotas) in order to achieve the optimal aggregate
groundwater extraction.
We assume two groups of farmers, each cultivating an area of equal size to produce a
homogenous product. We further assume that all pumped water is used in agricultural
activities and particularly to irrigate the two high water demanding crops.
Furthermore, in order to focus on the relationship between crop yield and water use,
we assume a simple crop-water production function which takes the following
quadratic form:3

f (q r,t ) = a r q r,t − b r q r,t 2 + g r

(1)

where qt is the per hectare annual consumption of irrigation water (m3/ha). a,b and g
are the fitting coefficients, determined for each type of crop (r=1,2) and depending on
climate conditions and soil properties, as well as on irrigation and agronomic
management practices in the reference area. These coefficients are assumed to be
constant in our analysis. Farm revenues are then expressed solely as a function of the
marginal product of water, even though other variable inputs are utilized (Burness and
Brill, 2001).
All farmers pump water from a single-cell unconfined aquifer (Figure 1), where the
groundwater resource is determined by a single variable such as the volume of water

3

Similar crop – water production functions have been used extensively, see for example Helweg
(1991).
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remaining in the aquifer or the height of the aquifer (water table). Throughout this
type of aquifer – which is often called “bathtub” – the water table and its fluctuation
are both considered as uniform (Brozovic et al., 2006). For simplicity we do not take
into account the drawdown within the well, because it is considered to have a constant
and small effect on the pumping level during each irrigation period.

Figure 1: Water level changes associated with groundwater pumping
Within this framework, the pumping level (zw) in a well is given by the following
equation:

z w = SL − H(t)

(2)

where SL is the height of the ground surface level and Η(t) is the height of water table
at time t.
Following Gisser and Sanchez (1980), we assume that the rate of change in the water


table, H(t)
is a function of the total volume of water used in irrigated agriculture
(total water pumped), as well as of certain hydrological conditions in the reference
area. In particular we assume that,

1

H(t)
=
[ N + (α − 1)Q t ]
AS

,

H(0) = H 0

,

H(T) ≥ H c

(3)

where Ν is the natural recharge of the aquifer, α is the constant return flow coefficient
(0 < α < 1), Qt is the total volume of water pumped and used at time t, A is the surface
6
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area of the groundwater reservoir, considered uniform in depth, S is the storativity
coefficient, Hc is the height of the bottom of the aquifer and H0 is the initial (current)
height of the water table.
We assume that the marginal cost of pumping (MCt), depends only on the pumping
level, z w = SL − H(t) . Since we neglect drawdown within the well, the pumping
level is the same as the water level of the aquifer, which implies zero marginal cost of
the drawdown.4 Furthermore, we assume a simple linear marginal cost function (Brill
and Burness, 1994):

MC t = c0 (SL − H(t))

(4)

where c0 is the marginal cost per cubic meter of water pumped, per meter of lift.

3. Individual farmer’s optimization model
The basic principles of groundwater aquifer exploitation in a typical common pool
model have been discussed thoroughly in the literature.5 One of the main results is
that in the absence of institutional rules (such as water pricing, water quotas, etc.)
individual farmers’ decisions concerning water pumping ignore the consequences of
their actions to other water users. Especially when there are many users, each
abstracting a small quantity as compared to the resource volume, the effect of
individuals’ current decisions on the future status of the regional groundwater stock is
considered negligible (Knapp et al, 2003). Therefore, individual farmers pump water
at rates that maximize their annual income, ignoring the future impact of their action
on the groundwater levels and consequently on other farmers’ as well as their own
future pumping costs.
The model used herein assumes that every irrigator in the study area tends to
maximize his annual income by using a semi-empirical approach to estimate his
pumping costs. This approach is based on farmers’ ability to assess their marginal
pumping costs (Eq.4) at the beginning of each irrigation period, just after the first
water abstractions. In addition, this model assumes that farmers are facing high
4

This is a simplifying assumption. In the more general case, the marginal cost of the drawdown is
incorporated in the marginal cost. See for example, Martin and Archer (1971) and Gisser and Sanchez
(1980).
5
See for example, Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Negri (1989) and Provencher and Burt (1993).
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investment costs and significant agricultural market constraints that affect their ability
to deal with higher water costs. Namely, under these assumptions, crop changes are
not considered as an economically viable solution and farmers are only left with the
possibility to adjust their water application levels.
Since we assume a uniform water table and a negligible drawdown within the wells,
marginal cost of pumping water is the same for both groups of farmers. Therefore,
their final decisions on water consumption vary only because of their different net
benefit functions (due to the diverse crop-water production function and the different
market price of each product). Thus, the annual net benefit (NB) for each group of
farmers is,

NBr,t = p r ⋅ f (q r,t ) − MC t ⋅ q r,t − Cnw r

(5)

where pr is the market price of each group’s crop and Cnwr is the cost of all other
inputs, assumed constant and independent of the total water use.
For simplicity, it is also assumed that the two groups of farmers irrigate a total land of
equal size, M hectares each. The allocation of land among farmers within each group
is not considered. Therefore, total annual water consumption is Qt=M(q1,t+q2,t).
Substituting this into equation 3, yields the following discrete-time equation,

H t +1 − H t =

1
⎡ N + (α − 1)M(q1,t + q 2,t ) ⎤⎦
AS ⎣

(6)

As already mentioned, farmers’ decisions on water consumption neglect the long-term
effects on the water table. Thus, each individual farmer selects to pump and use an
annual volume of groundwater that equates his marginal benefits of irrigation to his
marginal pumping costs.

MNBr,t = 0 ⇒ p r ⋅ f ′(q r,t ) = MC t

(7)

Assuming linear marginal benefits, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the increase in
marginal cost on qt. Over time, water consumption reduces as a result of the
continuous increase of pumping costs.

8
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Figure 2: Optimal groundwater use for each group of farmers during two different
time periods (years)
Substituting f(qr,t) and MCt from equations (1) and (4) respectively into equation (7)
and solving for qr,t, yields equation (8a). Given that total annual water consumption is
Qt=M(q1,t+q2,t), we also derive equation (8b).

q r,t =

ar
c
− 0 [S L − H t ]
2b r 2b r p r

⎡
a
c
1 ⎤
Q t =M ⋅ ⎢ ∑ r − 0 [SL − H t ] ⋅ ∑
⎥
r br pr ⎦
⎣ r 2b r 2

(8a)

(8b)

We derive water consumption for the next time period, qr,t+1, by substituting the
corresponding height of the water table, Ht+1, from equation (6), into the timeadjusted equation (8a).

q r,t +1 =

ar
c
− 0
2b r 2b r p r

1
⎡
⎤
⎢⎣SL − H t − AS ⎡⎣ N + (α − 1)M(q1,t + q 2,t ) ⎤⎦ ⎥⎦

(9)

It should be noted that the optimum individual annual consumption of irrigation water
at t+1, qr,t+1, is negatively related to the total volume of water used during the
previous time period, Qt.
Substituting qr,t from equation (8a) into (9), yields qr,t+1 as a function of qr,t.

q r,t +1 = q r,t +

c0
⎡ N + (α − 1)M(q1,t + q 2,t ) ⎤⎦
2b r p r AS ⎣

(10)
9
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Although the parameter Ht does not appear in equation (10), it is still indirectly
incorporated into the water use levels. Summing up both farmers’ groups annual
water consumption, and multiplying with the total cultivated area M yields the total
water consumption (abstraction) in the study area,

M ⋅ c 0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ (α − 1) ⎞ ⎛ M ⋅ c 0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ N ⎞
⎛
Q t +1 = Q t ⎜ 1 +
⎟+⎜
⎟
2 ⋅ AS
2 ⋅ AS
⎝
⎠ ⎝
⎠

(11)

where: Ω = ⎛⎜ 1 + 1 ⎞⎟
⎝ b1p1 b 2 p 2 ⎠
Equations (10) and (11) express the time path for both the individual and the total
groundwater use in irrigated agriculture as discrete-time functions.
Utilizing the initial condition H(0) = H0, equations (8a) and (8b) yield the initial
individual and total pumping water volumes.

q r,0 =

ar
c
− 0 (SL − H 0 )
2b r 2b r p r

⎡a
a ⎤ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω
Q0 = M ⋅ ⎢ 1 + 2 ⎥ −
[ SL − H 0 ]
2b
2b
2
2⎦
⎣ 1

(12a)

(12b)

The initial conditions allow us to formulate a first-order difference equation for the
total groundwater use Qt+Δτ=f(Qt). This equation fits well with the semi-empirical
estimation of farmers concerning their marginal pumping costs. The difference
equation can be written as:

Q t +1 = Δ ⋅ Q t + Κ
⎛
⎝

where Δ = ⎜ 1 +

(13)

M ⋅ c 0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ (α − 1) ⎞
⎛ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ N ⎞
⎟
⎟ and K = ⎜
2 ⋅ AS
2 ⋅ AS
⎠
⎝
⎠

The first step in solving equation (13) is to find a particular solution, denoted as Qs,
which is actually any solution to the above first order difference equation. A constant
over time variable is applied in equation (13) (Pemberton and Rau, 2001), giving the
following particular solution:

Qs= −

N
α −1

(14)

10
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The associated homogenous equation of equation (13) is Zt +1 = Δ ⋅ Zt ; hence the
complementary solution is Φ ⋅ Δ t , where Φ is an arbitrary constant. The general
solution to the difference equation is therefore:
t

M ⋅ c 0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ (α − 1) ⎞
N
⎛
Q t = Φ ⋅ ⎜1 +
⎟ −
2 ⋅ AS
⎝
⎠ α −1

(15)

The value of the constant Φ is next found by using the boundary condition (equation
(12b)) and thus the final solution concerning the time path of the aggregate
groundwater consumption reads:
t

N
⎛ N
⎞ ⎛ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ (α − 1) ⎞
Qt = ⎜
+ Q0 ⎟ ⋅ ⎜1 +
⎟ −
2 ⋅ AS
⎝ α −1
⎠ ⎝
⎠ α −1

t = 1,2,...T

(16)

Substituting Qt from equation (16) into (8b), yields the time-path of the water table
level,

H t = SL −

a1 b1 + a 2 b 2
2N
−
+
c0 ⋅ Ω
(α − 1) ⋅ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω

⎛
⎞ ⎛ N
2
⎞ ⎛ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω ⋅ (α − 1) ⎞
+⎜
+ Q0 ⎟ ⋅ ⎜ 1 +
⎟⋅⎜
⎟
2 ⋅ AS
⎠ ⎝
⎠
⎝ M ⋅ c0 ⋅ Ω ⎠ ⎝ α − 1

(17)

t

t = 1,2,...T

4. Social planner’s optimization model
Contrary to the myopic and competitive behavior of individual farmers concerning the
use of groundwater, the social planner’s objective is to choose a groundwater resource
allocation that maximizes the aggregate long-term net benefit. Moreover, this
allocation should guarantee a minimum stock of groundwater at the end of the
planning period. We assume that the social planner has full information regarding the
hydrological6 and the agro-economic7 conditions along the reference area. The model
used in this section is based on previous studies examining the optimization of the
inter-temporal groundwater allocation.8
The main objective of the social planner is to determine the optimal aggregate yearly
quota Q t and then to allocate the volume of water per hectare qr,t to each farmer in
6

The hydrological conditions include the current groundwater level, the return flow coefficient and the
natural recharge of the aquifer.
7
The agro-economic conditions include the market value of agricultural products, the crop-water
production functions and the marginal pumping cost.
8
Among them, the most characteristic of these studies are: Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Feinerman and
Knapp (1983), Laukkanen and Koundouri (2006) and Pitafi and Roumasset (2009).
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group r (r=1,2) for the year t. In order to achieve this objective, the social planner
may implement either a tradable water permit or a non-transferable quota system.
Both systems are analyzed in detail in the rest of this section.

4.1. Tradable water permits system

Under the tradable permits system, each farmer is allowed to trade part of, or even the
whole of, his water entitlement with other farmers during the year of issue. For the
specific case of an annual tradable permit system with two equal-size groups, the total
water volume used by all irrigators during a typical year t is:

Q t = M(q1,t + q2,t ) = M(q1,t + q 2,t )

(18)

After receiving its water entitlement, each farmer chooses her water use in each
particular time period. Assuming a perfectly competitive market for water quotas and
zero transaction costs, efficiency requires that at the equilibrium the marginal net
benefits are equalized among the two farmers’ groups.9
MNB1,t = MNB2,t

(19)

Equations (18) and (19) describe the equilibrium state of the system at time t. The
solution of this system yields the water volume used by each group of farmers at t, as
a function of the aggregate water quota in the reference area:
⎛ a1p1 − a 2 p 2
Q ⎞
1
+ p2b2 t ⎟
⎜
p1b1 + p 2 b 2 ⎝
2
M⎠
⎛ a 2 p 2 − a1p1
Q ⎞
1
=
+ p1b1 t ⎟
⎜
p1b1 + p 2 b 2 ⎝
2
M⎠

q1,t =
q 2,t

(20)

The social planner’s objective is to determine the optimal path of aggregate water use
over the planning period, taking into account the optimal choice of farmers at each
time period given by equation (20). To obtain this, the regulator maximizes the sum of
the flow of individual farmers’ net benefits over a fixed time horizon t ∈ [ 0, T ] subject
to the transition equation on the water level of the aquifer (equation (3)). A fixed time
horizon is used instead of the infinite horizon, since this concept better fits the
planning process of a regulating agency (Xepapadeas, 1996). Additionally, the social
planner has to guarantee that at T, a minimum level of water table Hmin should be
preserved. Therefore, the social planner solves,
9

See among others Griffin (2006).
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T

⎡
⎤
max ∫ e−δt ⎢∑ ( pr ⋅ f (q r,t ) − Ct (H t ) ⋅ q r,t ) ⎥ dt
Q(t)
⎣ r
⎦
0
subject to:
 = 1 ⎡ N + (α − 1) ⋅ Q ⎤ , H(0) = H
H(t)
t⎦
0
AS ⎣

(21)

,

H(T) = Hmin

where δ is the discount rate. 10
This is a formal optimal control problem. The current value Hamiltonian is,

 = ⎡ ∑ ( p ⋅ f (q ) − C (H ) ⋅ q ) ⎤ + μ ⎡ 1 ( N + (α − 1) ⋅ Q ) ⎤
Η
r
r,t
t
t
r,t ⎥
t ⎥
⎢
⎢⎣ AS
⎦
⎣ r
⎦

(22)

where μ represents the shadow value of groundwater (i.e. the change in the marginal
use cost of groundwater as the water table changes over time). This parameter
differentiates the social from the private optimal solution. Given the current value
Hamiltonian and assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions for
optimization (optimality condition and adjoint equation respectively) are the
following:

 ∂Q = 0
∂H
t

(

(23a)

)

 ∂H(t) ⇒ μ = δμ − c Q
μ = δμ − ∂H
0 t

(23b)

Equation (23a) implies that the total marginal net benefits from water use are equal to
the shadow value of the actual volume of water pumped from the aquifer. To solve
this equation for μ an initial condition should be specified for the shadow value of
groundwater. In order to reduce the number of unknown variables in this condition
(there are two unknown variables, Q t and Ht), the state equation (3) is used once again
and solved for Q t . Following this, the shadow value of groundwater is determined as,

μ=

 −N
⎤
ΑSH
ΑS ⎡
t
⋅ ⎢Π − Θ ⋅
− c0 (SL − H t ) ⎥
(1 − α) ⎣
α −1
⎦

(24)

where:
10

For simplicity we choose to express the terminal condition as an equality instead of an inequality. In
the case examined, this simplification is close to reality since total water consumption will always tend
to reach the maximum allowable volume and water table will subsequently always approximate the
lower limit.
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Θ=

2p1b1p 2 b 2
M ( p1b1 + p 2 b 2 )

,

Π=

p1p 2 (a1b 2 + a 2 b1 )
( p1b1 + p 2 b 2 )

(25)

Differentiating equation (24) with respect to time and equating to the right hand side
of (23b) yields,
δμ − c0 Q t =


AS ⎡ ASH
t
 ⎤
⋅ ⎢Θ
+ c0 H
t⎥
(1 − α) ⎣ 1 − α
⎦

(26)

Substituting μ from (24) and Q t from the state equation and rearranging terms gives
the following second order differential equation,
 − δH
 − ⎛ δc0 (1 − α) ⎞ H − 1 − α ⎡δΠ − δc S − c0 N − δΘN ⎤ = 0
H
t
t
0 L
⎜
⎟ t
ASΘ ⎣⎢
AS 1 − α ⎦⎥
⎝ ASΘ ⎠

(27)

The general solution of the above differential equation can be estimated by reducing it
to a first order equation after factorization,
⎡ N
Π
ΘN ⎤
+ SL − −
H t = X1eρ1 ⋅t + X 2 eρ2 ⋅t + ⎢
⎥
c0 c0 (α − 1) ⎦
⎣ δAS

(28)

where, X1 and X2 are arbitrary constants, while ρ1 and ρ2 are the roots of the
polynomial function, after the factorization of differential operators. These roots are
equal to,
δ
δ 2 δc0 (α − 1)
δ
δ 2 δc0 (α − 1)
, ρ2 = +
ρ1 = −
−
−
2
4
ASΘ
2
4
ASΘ

(29)

Applying the boundary conditions H(0)=H0 and H(T)=Hmin to (28), yields X1 and X2,
⎡ N
Π
ΘN ⎤
H 0 ⋅ eρ2 ⋅Τ − Η min − ( eρ2 ⋅Τ − 1) ⋅ ⎢
+ SL − −
c0 c0 (α − 1) ⎥⎦
δAS
⎣
X1 =
( eρ2 ⋅Τ − eρ1⋅Τ )
⎡ N
Π
ΘN ⎤
Η min − H 0 ⋅ eρ1 ⋅Τ + ( eρ1 ⋅Τ − 1) ⋅ ⎢
+ SL − −
c0 c0 (α − 1) ⎥⎦
δAS
⎣
X2 =
( eρ2 ⋅Τ − eρ1⋅Τ )

(30)

Then, the aggregate annual allowable consumption of groundwater resources is,
Qt =

AS ⋅ ⎡⎣ρ1X1eρ1 ⋅t + ρ2 X 2 eρ2 ⋅t ⎤⎦ − Ν
α −1

(31)
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Recalling now the allocation of water permits, according to the equilibrium state of
Eq.20, it is also possible to estimate the annual volume of water used by each farmer
when a tradable permit system is in place.
⎛ a p −a p
AS ⋅ ⎡⎣ρ1X1eρ1 ⋅t + ρ2 X 2 eρ2 ⋅t ⎤⎦ − Ν ⎞
1
1 1
2 2
⎜
⎟
q1,t =
+ p2 b2
⎟
p1b1 + p 2 b 2 ⎜
2
M ⋅ (α − 1)
⎝
⎠
⎛ a p −a p
AS ⋅ ⎣⎡ρ1X1eρ1 ⋅t + ρ2 X 2 eρ2 ⋅t ⎦⎤ − Ν ⎞
1
2 2
1 1
⎜
⎟
+ p1b1
q 2,t =
⎟
p1b1 + p 2 b 2 ⎜
2
M ⋅ (α − 1)
⎝
⎠

(32)

4.2. Non-tradable quota system

Contrary to the above mentioned market approach, under the non-tradable quota
system farmers cannot sell their water shares to others. Annual water rights are
granted free of charge and are allocated based on the historical use of irrigation water.
Specifically, the maximum volume of water per hectare that each farmer in group r
(r=1,2) is permitted to use during the year t is
qr,t = v t ⋅ q r,0

(33)

where, qr,0 is the initial individual pumping water volume, from equation (12a), and vt
is the water use reduction rate over time (as compared to the initial volumes). This
rate is the same for both groups of farmers.
Following this allocation rule, the total water volume used by all irrigators during a
typical year t is now determined as,
Q t = M(q1,t + q 2,t ) = M ⋅ v t (q1,0 + q 2,0 )

(34)

Using equations (33) and (34) instead of the market equilibrium state (20) and solving
once again the former optimal control problem (21) yields the time-path of the
aggregate annual allowable consumption of groundwater resources under the water
quota system. The general form of this function is identical to equation (31). However,
the time-path differs: (a) in the values of the polynomial function’s roots (ρ´1, ρ´2),
ρ1′ =

δ
δ 2 δc0 (α − 1) ( q1,0 + q 2,0 )
δ
δ2 δc0 (α − 1) ( q1,0 + q 2,0 )
′
, ρ2 = +
−
−
−
2
4
ASΘ′
2
4
ASΘ′

(35)

as well as, (b), in the values of the arbitrary constraints (X´1, X´2),
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⎡ N
⎤
Π′
Θ′N
+ SL −
−
H 0 ⋅ eρ′2 ⋅Τ − Η min − ( eρ′2 ⋅Τ − 1) ⋅ ⎢
⎥
δAS
c0 (q1,0 + q 2,0 ) c0 (α − 1)(q1,0 + q 2,0 ) ⎦
⎣
X1′ =
( eρ′2 ⋅Τ − eρ1′ ⋅Τ )

(36)

⎡ N
⎤
Π′
Θ′N
Η min − H 0 ⋅ eρ1′ ⋅Τ + ( eρ1′ ⋅Τ − 1) ⋅ ⎢
+ SL −
−
⎥
δAS
c0 (q1,0 + q 2,0 ) c0 (α − 1)(q1,0 + q 2,0 ) ⎦
⎣
′
X2 =
( eρ′2 ⋅Τ − eρ1′ ⋅Τ )

where,

( 2p b q ) + ( 2p b q )
Θ′ =
M (q + q )
2
1 1 1,0

2

1,0

2

2
2,0

,

Π′ = q1,0 a1p1 + q 2,0 a 2 p 2

(37)

2,0

The decision about the implementation or not of a regulated system of water
allocation is mainly influenced by the divergence on water table levels between the
individual and the social planner’s model. The final outcome of the social planner’s
optimization model, no-matter the allocation mechanism, seems to depend largely on
the initial water table level and on the environmental (hydrological) targets.
Specifically, the annual volume of water granted to farmers is mainly determined by
the desired stock of water resources when t=T.
On the other hand, the decision between tradable water permits and non-tradable
quotas depends on the additional net benefits (water use efficiency) provided by the
market approach. Tradable permits are expected to increase efficiency if the two
groups of farmers have substantially different marginal benefit functions11. Dissimilar
crop prices and diverse production functions (mainly in terms of the coefficient a)
may lead to this condition. Furthermore, when strict hydrological constraints (targets)
are applied, tradable permits seem to generate higher net benefits as compared to the
non-transferable quotas.
It should be also noted that the market system offers flexibility, as it allows each
farmer to make periodical (annual) adjustments to the use of his water shares, in order
to adapt to potential variations in environmental or economic factors that are
considered, so far, to be constant in time. This flexibility can also be interpreted in
economic terms (e.g. higher net benefits of tradable permits during dry years).
11

Marginal cost functions are assumed to be equal in both groups of farmers.
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5. Empirical Application
5.1. Study area and data

The theoretical model developed in the previous sections is applied to the case of
groundwater management in the Moudania agricultural region, in Northern Greece.
The basic criteria for selecting this particular region are the following: (a) agriculture
is one of the main activities in the area, (b) groundwater is intensively used for
irrigation and (c) there is a deficit in the water balance of the river basin. It should be
also noted that the water used for local agricultural activities derives solely from
pumping numerous wells (more than 800 wells in the study area), the majority of
which are located in the southern part of the basin (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Study area map

Current agricultural patterns and practices are extremely dependent on water
resources, leading thus to a severe over-pumping of the aquifer. According to a local
water management plan, the annual demand for water outweighs the annual supply by
5.5 millions m3/year, causing a steady decline in the aquifer’s water level equal to
0.6m/year (Latinopoulos, 2003). Table 1 summarizes the main hydrological data for
the study area.

Source: (Latinopoulos, 2003)

Table 1: Hydrological data in the study area

The most needed agro-economic data were collected from the databases of Hellenic
Statistical Authority, as well as from a questionnaire survey in the area (Pagidis and
Latinopoulos, 2008). As far as the crop share is concerned, almost 50% of the
17
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irrigated area is cultivated with olive trees. In the remaining area, the prevailing crops
are: orchard trees (30% of the total area), vegetables, cotton and corn. In order to feed
the data into our theoretical model, we assume that there are only two crops, olive and
orchard trees, each of which occupies half of the total irrigated area (M=1300 ha).
The restructuring of the area’s cropping plans seems to be an economically inefficient
solution due to the high percentage of permanent crops (crops that are actually
associated with high investment costs). For this reason, the potential increase of the
marginal pumping (use) cost of water is not going to alter the crop-mix of the area.
Consequently, the irrigation water demand function should be derived from yield
reductions (i.e. income losses) of the existing crops due to deficit irrigation practices.
In other words, the water demand functions for both groups of farmers are equivalent
to the crop-water production functions (equation (1)).
The coefficients ar, br and gr of these functions are estimated according to the local
climate, soil and crop characteristics, as well as, to water application efficiency and
irrigation scheduling. They are in fact the result of a regression analysis (linear OLS
regression) on crop responses to the corresponding sequential reductions of water
consumption. Crop responses on different water use levels are estimated by means of
specific computer software, called CROPWAT and provided by FAO (Smith, 1992).
The resulting equations are presented in Table 2, along with other relevant agroeconomic data. Substituting these data in (5) gives the net benefit functions for both
groups of farmers. It is worth mentioning that the first group: (a) is currently
associated with higher economic output (net benefits per hectare of cultivated land),
due to the higher market price of olives, and (b) maximizes its yield at lower water
use levels than the second group, due to its water-yield function (i.e. a less-water
demanding crop).

Parameter
Co
Μ
f(q1,t)

Description

Value

Pumping cost per cubic meter of water pumped per
meter of lift
Total cultivated area by each group of farmers
st

Production function for the 1 group of farmers

0.0004 €/m3
1300 ha
0.778qt – 0.000058qt2 + 1440

18
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(crop: olive tree) – kg/ha
f(q2,t)

Production function for the 2nd group of farmers
(crop: orchards) – kg/ha

1.501qt – 0.000094qt2 + 4910

p(q1,t)

Current price of the crop of group1

1.20 €/kg

p(q2,t)

Current price of the crop of group1

0.42 €/kg

Cnw1
Cnw2

Cost of the other crop inputs (apart from water) for
the 1st group of farmers
Cost of the other crop inputs (apart from water) for
the 2nd group of farmers

2700 €/ha
3150 €/ha

Table 2: Agro-economic data in the study area
5.2 Results of the optimization model

A time horizon (planning period) of 40 years ( t ∈ [0, T], T = 40 ) is chosen and used in
both models; the individual and the social planner one. As already mentioned, the
individual farmer’s model is based on the hypothesis that each farmer maximizes his
net benefit for given pumping decisions of other farmers, taking under consideration
an empirical pumping cost estimation (at the beginning of the irrigation period).
Substituting thus the data from Tables 1 and 2 into (16), the resulting time path for the
aggregate water use is,

Q t = 11,620,647 + 5,922, 472 ⋅ (0.9989) t

t = 1,2,...40

(38)

Likewise, from (17), the time path for the water table height is,

H t = − 513.81 + 573.81 ⋅ (0.9989) t

t = 1, 2,...40

(39)

From the above equations it becomes evident that there is only a very small decline in
the long term use of groundwater resources, indicating the limited effect of water
pumping costs to current and future decisions of farmers. Namely, the annual
reduction of water consumption in the next 20 and 40 years is estimated to be equal to
0.7% and 1.4% of the current usage, respectively. Hence, given the current deficit
water balance, a substantial drawdown of the water table (i.e. a decline of water stock)
is expected. From (17) the average annual drop of the water table level is found equal
to 0.59 m (the range of this measure varies from 0.58m/year to 0.61m/year),
confirming the outcome of the local water management plan (Latinopoulos, 2003) and
resulting in a total drawdown of 23.8m, at the end of the planning period (t=40).
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In order to implement the social planner’s model in the study area, we need to
determine the appropriate discount rate and to set the environmental target of the
water policy, that is, the terminal value of the water table level. A generally accepted
social discount rate for this kind of problems usually varies from 2% to 4% (Pearce
and Ulph, 1995; Spackman, 2006). On this account, a discount rate equal to 3% was
selected. Concerning the terminal value of the water table, a value equal to 50m was
chosen (HT=50) to safeguard the minimum impact of the drawdown to the coastal
areas (i.e. to minimize seawater intrusion into coastal wells). Combining these values
with the hydrologic and socioeconomic data of Tables 1 and 2, the following timepaths for the water table height and aggregate water use are obtained:
Tradable water permit system

H t = 529.57e −0.001⋅t + 4.56e 0.031⋅t − 474.14

(40)

Q t = 11, 620, 647 + 5, 285, 723e −0.001⋅t − 1,382, 069e 0.031⋅t

(41)

Non-tradable quota system

H t = 555.94e −0.001⋅t + 4.63e0.031⋅t − 500.56

(42)

Q t = 11, 620, 647 + 5,312, 043e −0.001⋅t − 1,398,829e0.031⋅t

(43)

It is worth-mentioning that, contrary to the individual farmer’s optimization model,
both approaches followed here by the social planner result in a large variation of the
annual drawdown (from 0.04m/year to 0.40m/year). This variation is mainly due to
the discount effect, which leads to higher values at the first planning years and lower
values at the end of the time horizon. It is also apparent from the equations (40-43)
that there are no significant deviations in the time-paths generated by the tradable and
non-tradable permit systems.
Comparing the results of the aggregate water consumption in both models (Figure 4)12
confirms the expectation that when decisions are made by individual farmers,
irrigated agriculture is usually leading to overconsumption of groundwater resources.
In particular, the excessive water consumption is growing over time, starting from an
initial (t=1) value of 2.02 millions m3 (13% more than the corresponding estimate of
the tradable permit model) and finally (t=40) reaching the value of 5.38 millions m3
12

The social planner’s model is represented only by the tradable permit system. The reason is that the
time path of both permit systems are almost identical (their annual variation is less than 0.15%), and
hence appear as a single curve in Figures 4 and 5.

20
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper576

20

Latinopoulos and Sartzetakis: Optimal Exploitation of Groundwater and the Potential for a

(45% more than the corresponding estimates of the tradable permit model). This
divergence is partly due to the fact that farmers do not consider the scarcity cost of
groundwater resources. However, the main cause of this divergence is the social
planner’s sustainable water management policy, as expressed by means of the
terminal value of the water table level (Hmin). It should be also mentioned that
The overconsumption of water resources under the individual farmer’s model is
indirectly presented in Figure 5, where the time path for the height of the water table
is shown. According to this figure, individual farmer’s model results to an almost
linear negative slopped function, leading to a water table height equal to 36.2m. On
the other hand, social planner’s time-path for the stock availability is an exponential
function leading by definition to the pre-selected water table level (HT=50).
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Figure 4: Time path for aggregate water consumption at the individual farmer’s and

the social planner’s optimum
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Figure 5: Time path for the water table height at the individual farmer’s and the

social planner’s optimum
As expected, the dissimilar patterns of water consumption between the two models
induce significant differences in their economic results, which are illustrated in Figure
6. Namely, the application of the social planer’s model and the attainment of the
associated environmental targets may cause a notable decrease in farmers’ income.
The additional total annual cost (loss of net benefits) of the tradable permit approach
ranges from € 81,000 (t=1), up to € 496,000 (t=40). These costs estimates are
equivalent to the 2.3% and 14.6%, respectively, of the aggregate annual net benefits
in the study area, as calculated in the individual farmer’s model.
In order to examine the efficiency of tradable permits, as compared to the nontradable quotas it is worthwhile to compare the aggregate net benefits generated by
these two approaches during the planning period T. As shown in Figure 6, there is a
little additional benefit from the implementation of the market system (0.4% of the
aggregate net benefits). This outcome is not surprising, considering the similarity
between the marginal benefits in the two groups of farmers. However, this is not a
general rule concerning the efficiency of tradable permits in irrigated agriculture. To
support the latter argument, the model was tested under various scenarios of data
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modification (i.e. different crop prices, production functions and water constraints),
which result to a range of additional net benefits from 0 up to 15%13.
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Figure 6: Time path for the aggregate net benefits in all three models

Finally, in order to find the time path for the price of water permits, a simple
expression, recommended by Griffin (2006), is adopted:

Ptz = MNB1,t = MNB2,t

(44)

According to Griffin (2006), when many agents (e.g. farmers) are present, the market
price of water permits is likely to be equal to individual farmers’ net benefit, at the
equilibrium state. Marginal net benefits can be easily estimated according to the social
planner’s model (i.e. the tradable permit approach), by making use of the optimum
individual water consumption (qr,t). In this framework, the time path for the market
price of water permits is determined as:

Ptz = 0.0156 + 0.007 ⋅ e −0.001t + 0.055 ⋅ e0.031t

(45)

13

For example: (a) a stricter water constraint: H(T)=60 leads to additional net benefits equal to 1.3%,
(b) a double price on the crop of group 1 leads to additional net benefits equal to 5%, (c) an alternative
crop for the 1st group (with higher marginal productivity) may lead to additional net benefits up to 10%.
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Figure 7 illustrates the graphical representation of Eq.39. The market price of tradable
water permits seems to increase in a slightly exponential way through time.
Specifically, the initial price is found equal to 0.079 €/m3, while the final price is
equal to 0.210 €/m3 (t=40). This price increase is mainly due to the decreasing (in
time) optimal level of individual water consumption.
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Figure 7: Time path for the price of water permits

4. Conclusions

The present paper analyzed a problem of groundwater allocation in irrigated
agriculture. On this purpose two different models are analyzed and then compared.
The first model examined the long-term results of a free access system to groundwater
resources, under the assumption that farmers act myopically and take short-term
(annual) decisions concerning water abstractions (use). On the other hand, the optimal
allocation from the social planner’s point of view was estimated by means of an
optimal control approach, under the assumption that the final resolution (allocation)
will provide a feedback to a tradable permit system. Comparing thus the outcomes of
these two models can help in identifying the potential for a future tradable water
permit system.
The analysis of the individual farmer’s model showed that the depletion of
groundwater resources is a very likely scenario when: (a) decisions concerning
individual water abstractions don’t take under consideration the possible externalities
24
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of their action, b) the pumping costs do not constitute a significant component of
production costs, which is a common phenomenon in Greek agriculture. The
depletion time depends on the current water balance of the aquifer, as well as, on its
initial stock (water table) level.
On the other hand, the analysis of the social planner’s model showed that the time
path of water availability (e.g. the time path for the water table level of the aquifer) is
determined by the long-term net benefits of farmers, as well as by the desired water
table level (as defined by the river basin water authority) at the end of the planning
horizon. A sensitivity analysis on the final water table level can actually act as a
multicriteria problem with two objective functions: maximum income versus
minimum depletion. The efficient solution set for this problem can form the basis for
future groundwater resource management.
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However, numerous externalities associated with common property groundwater
extraction and the myopic behaviour of water users, impede market operation and
hinder the efficiency of the permit market system. Furthermore, a number of problems,
affecting the system’s effectiveness, may arise during implementation and are due to:
the existing institutional framework,14 the lack of information from the relevant water
authorities 15 and the excessive transaction and monitoring costs of these systems.
Addressing these problems, so as to achieve the efficiency potential of tradable permit
systems for groundwater resources, poses a great challenge for water managers and
scientists alike.

14

For example, free access to groundwater, water rights strictly related to the land ownership, etc.
For example, information concerning water demand, the current water balance in the reference basin,
the current stock of groundwater resources, etc.

15
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